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SPOUSE ABUSE: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE OF THUMB*
English common law rule of thumb - The husband has the right to inflict
moderate personal chastisement on his wife, provided he use a switch no
larger than his thumb.
3 Va. Law Reg. 241 (1917)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970's, the nation has been giving increased attention to
the problem of spouse abuse.1 This increased attention arose a decade
after the nation became acutely aware that child abuse was a problem in
this country.2 Heightened awareness of the fact that violence occurs be-
tween family members was accompanied by recognition that available le-
gal remedies were inadequate.3 The remedies available to the abused
spouse in most states other than Virginia include not only prosecution
through the criminal justice system but also civil protective orders which
may be obtained by victims either as an alternative to or in conjunction
with criminal prosecution. To insure that such orders accomplish the pur-
pose of preventing further abuse, courts can decree that the abuser be
denied use and possession of a shared residence for a specified period of
time. This type of protection raises due process issues, in light of the fact
that these orders may be obtained in an ex parte proceeding. Such pro-
tective orders, however, have thus far withstood constitutional attack.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the incidence of spouse
abuse in the United States and in Virginia; to review Virginia's response
to the problem of spouse abuse; to review the legal remedies currently
available in Virginia; and to present a justification and proposal for legis-
lation, based on the experiences of other states, which will enable abuse
victims to obtain civil protective orders.
* Grateful acknowledgement goes to Linda Sawyers, Executive Assistant, Virginia
Department of Serial Services, who was the catalyst for this research and provided much of
the background material on domestic violence in Virginia.
1. M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETz, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERI-
CAN FAMILY 10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BEHIND CLOSED DOORS].
2. Id. at 8-9.
3. See generally Boylan & Taub, Inadequacy of Legal Remedies, in ADULT DOMESTIC VI-
OLENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES, Part II, 34 (1981) reprinted in
Taub, Equitable Relief in Cases of Adult Domestic Violence, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 241,
252 (1981)); Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
895, 905 (1981); D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVEs 87 (1981); Comment, Wife Abuse: Failure of
Legal Remedies, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 549 (1978).
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II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - AN OVERVIEW4
A. National Data
It is almost impossible to identify an incidence rate of spouse abuse in
a particular community, in a particular state or across the nation as a
whole. There is virtually no uniform means of data collection which re-
flects the extent of intrafamily violence. Law enforcement agencies gener-
ally do not keep records which distinguish assault between family mem-
bers from that which occurs between strangers. One researcher estimates
that police answer more calls concerning family conflicts than all calls for
criminal incidents combined.5 Even so, the commentators agree that
those victims who identify themselves to law enforcement are only the tip
of the iceberg.6 One Kentucky study revealed that battered women called
police in less than ten percent of the cases.7
The Federal Bureau of Investigation compiles data on the incidence of
intrafamily homicide. In 1981, fifty-five percent of the 20,053 murders re-
ported were committed by relatives or persons known to the victims. Sev-
enteen percent of the murders were committed by family members; one-
half of those murders were committed by a spouse. Approximately 3.8%
of the murder victims were husbands, and 4.8% were wives.8
An alarming statistic compiled by the FBI is that during 1981, of the
ninety-one law enforcement officers killed, nineteen were killed while re-
sponding to domestic disturbance calls.9 The FBI maintains no data on
the high incidence of assaults against police while responding to such
calls.10
One group of researchers suggest that at a minimum, husband-wife vio-
lence occurs in at least one-fourth of American families. 1 After con-
ducting research which involved 2143 families across the nation, they con-
cluded that in sixteen percent of American couples, at least one violent
4. It is beyond the scope of this comment to deal adequately with the sociological and
psychological aspects of the causes and treatment of domestic violence. For information on
those topics, see BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 1; D. MARTIN, supra note 3; M.D.
PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING (1981); M. Roy, BATTERED WOMEN (1977); M. RoY, THE ABU-
SIVE PARTNER (1982); S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
For a general discussion of special issues concerning intra-family violence, see Sympo-
sium: Family Violence in America, 6-7 VT. L. REV., Parts I-II (1982).
5. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Parnas, The Police Response to the
Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914).
6. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 1, at 6.
7. M. SCHULMAN, A SURVEY OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 3 (1979).
8. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 10-11 (1981).
9. Id. at 310. Disturbance calls include family quarrels and man with a gun.
10. The Virginia State Police report that approximately 20% of officer assaults occur in
response to disturbance calls. Va. State Police, Crime in Virginia - 1982 (to be published
June 1983).
11. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 1, at 18.
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act is committed each year against a partner. Twenty-eight percent of the
couples had experienced violence at some time during the course of their
marriage.1 2 These researchers also suggest that these statistics underesti-
mate the actual incidence of spousal violence.13
Although spouse abuse often is equated with "wife-beating," the study
revealed that husbands are assaulted even more often than wives. The
rates for assaults (those attacks which could cause serious injury) on
wives was 3.8%, or 1.8 million wives, per year; 4.6%, or over two million
husbands, were assaulted yearly by their wives.'
4
Research also indicates that violence between spouses, once initiated,
becomes a recurrent event: "Forty-seven percent of the husbands who
beat their wives did so three or more times during the year, and 53 per-
cent of the husband-beaters did so 3 or more times." 15 A study of domes-
tic homicides in Kansas City revealed that in eighty-five percent of the
cases police previously had been called to the residence, and in fifty per-
cent of the cases, the police had responded to disturbance calls five or
more times before the death.'
6
B. Virginia
There is little statistical information on spouse abuse available in Vir-
ginia, since state law does not require law enforcement agencies to com-
pile statistics on crimes between family members. However, some agen-
cies do so on their own initiative. For instance, in 1974, police in Fairfax
County received 4073 family disturbance calls. As a result, an estimated
thirty assault warrants were sought by wives each week.1
7
The Virginia State Police report that of the 404 murders in 1982, 9.9%,
or forty victims, were murdered by their current spouse, a decrease from
the fifty-four spousal murders in 1981.18 Unfortunately, no similar records
are kept on other intra-family assaults.
The Virginia Department of Social Services collects data from twenty-
five specialized projects across the state that offer services to abused
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. at 40-41. These findings do not mean that wives as victims should not remain the
focus of social policy since women are typically in the weaker, more vulnerable position. Id.
at 43-44. See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVm RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC
POLICY 469-70 (1978) (indicating that wife-beating is more underreported than husband-
beating and that wives are at greater risk of and actually receive more serious injuries than
men).
15. BEHIND CLOSED DooRs, supra note 1, at 41.
16. N. LOVING, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE & WIFE BEATING - A GUIDE FOR POLICE 38
(1980).
17. D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1974, at 18).
18. Va. State Police, Crime in Virginia - 1982 (to be published June 1983).
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spouses. For the six-month period of January to June, 1982, 4941 abused
women requested services from these programs. 9 This figure again repre-
sents only the "tip of the iceberg" since the Kentucky study revealed that
victims of abuse only rarely seek aid outside the family.20
III. VIRGINIA'S RESPONSE TO DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE
A. Traditional Criminal Response
Virginia has traditionally treated spousal abuse no differently than as-
sault between strangers. The victim may pursue traditional criminal rem-
edies by having the abusing spouse prosecuted for a misdemeanor or fel-
ony, depending on the seriousness of the injury.21 A law enforcement
officer summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance may arrest an
abusing spouse without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that a felony has been committed. 22 Generally, an officer can arrest
one who has committed a misdemeanor only if the offense took place in
the officer's presence. However, a 1982 amendment enables an officer to
make a warrantless arrest for an assault and battery not committed in his
presence but based "on probable cause upon reasonable complaint of the
person who observed the alleged offense. '23
Law enforcement agencies, however, have been accused of treating vic-
tims of spousal assault differently and with less enthusiasm than victims
of non-domestic assault. The belief that police have responded to domes-
tic calls with a policy of minimum intervention and avoidance of arrest
was tested in a research study involving 596 police investigations in three
metropolitan areas: Rochester, New York, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida,
and St. Louis, Missouri.24 The findings point to a lack of law enforcement
in the area of domestic disputes. The dispatchers did not accurately re-
port the severity of the assault, and the police were slower in their initial
19. VA. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF SPOUSE ABUSE SERVICES, JAN.
1982-JuNE 1982, at 2.
20. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 55. Counseling was received in seven percent of the
incidents, shelter and legal aid in only three percent, and child care in only two percent,
although a larger number of the women surveyed indicated a desire to receive such services.
Forty-three percent of the women turned to no one for help. Id. at 48.
21. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Repl. VoL 1982) (assault or assault and battery is
a Class 1 misdemeanor) with id. § 18.2-51 (malicious shooting, stabbing, cutting or wound-
ing or other act with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill is a Class 3 felony or Class 6
felony in the absence of malice). The Fairfax County Circuit Court recently held that under
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Repl. Vol. 1982), a man can be prosecuted for raping his wife
subsequent to their separation. Commonwealth v. Weishaupt, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2248
(Cir. Ct. of Fairfax Co., Va. 1983).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Curn. Supp. 1982).
23. Id.
24. Oppenlander, Coping or Copping Out - Police Service Delivery in Domestic Disputes,
20 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 451 (1982).
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response. Conditions more conducive to arrest were inordinately higher
than the actual arrest rate. Officers tended to mediate these situations,
although most had no training in mediation or crisis intervention so that
they necessarily relied on their own life experiences in prescribing solu-
tions.25 These findings, along with statistics on spousal abuse, suggest
that stronger enforcement of the law rather than crisis counseling in the
initial stages of this recurring type of family problem could prevent
spousal murder in some cases.2 '
The Executive Deputy Chief of the Detroit Police Department has
noted the nonresponsiveness of the legal system. In 1972, 4900 assaults
survived the screening process, and a warrant was issued. However,
"[t]hrough the process of conciliation, complainant harassment and pros-
ecutor discretion fewer than 300 of the cases were ultimately tried by a
court of law."2
7
Frustrated by law enforcement agencies' failure to respond, battered
women brought class action suits against police departments in New York
City2s and Oakland, California.29 The New York City case ended by a
consent decree in which the department agreed to make arrests where
there is reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed, to send
one or more officers to respond to every call in which assault or
threatened assault was alleged, to inform an abuse victim of the available
criminal and civil remedies, to protect or assist a victim in need of medi-
cal care and to help locate the abusing spouse when he has left the
scene.30 The Oakland case was settled out of court; the department
agreed to treat domestic violence as criminal conduct and make arrests
where appropriate, to develop training materials and to develop a bro-
chure of resources available to abused spouses.3 1
Although skeptics have predicted a low conviction rate in spouse abuse
cases, a prosecutor from New York recently reported that where enforce-
ment of the law in spouse abuse cases is given a high priority, the convic-
tion rate is over ninety-four percent. Also, contrary to the popular notion
that abuse victims fail to follow through with criminal charges, this prose-
cutor reported that eighty-two percent of the victims in his jurisdiction
25. Id. at 462.
26. Id. at 463.
27. James Bannon, Law Enforcement Problems with Intra-family Violence 5 (presenta-
tion to the American Bar Association Convention, August 12, 1975).
28. Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 64
A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901
(1979).
29. Scott v. Hart, No. 6-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 28, 1976).
30. N. LOVING, supra note 16, at 36-37. See Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered
Women, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 39 (1981) (a summary of subsequent litigation to improve
the legal response to spousal abuse).
31. N. LOVING, supra note 16, at 37.
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did follow through.32
B. Traditional Quasi-Criminal Relief
Under section 19.2-19 of the Virginia Code, a court must require one
who threatens to kill, injure, or commit violence against the person or
property of another to give a recognizance to keep the peace.33 An act of
violence need not have occurred as long as there is good cause to fear that
a person intends to commit an offense.34 In such cases, the respondent
posts a peace bond with the court and upon his good behavior in keeping
the peace for a period of time not to exceed one year, the money is reim-
bursed.35 However, since peace bonds impose a "conditional fine" where
an offense has not yet been committed, the constitutionality of such
bonds is suspect on double jeopardy and due process grounds.36 Peace
bonds are also generally criticized for their ineffectiveness in intrafamily
violence.3 7
C. Traditional Civil Remedies - Tort Suits
Traditionally, tort suits between spouses have been barred by the doc-
trine of intraspousal tort immunity in Virginia.38 However, such immu-
nity has been expressly abrogated by statute.3 9 While this statute opens
the door for a battered spouse to be compensated for injuries received at
the hands of an abusing partner, a tort suit does little to offer protection
and immediate relief in the midst of a violent episode.
32. Pirro, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Court Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 352, 356
(1982).
For further discussion on the role of law enforcement, see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROSE-
CUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES (1980).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-19 (Cum. Supp. 1982):
If any person threatens to kill or injure another or to commit violence or injury
against his person or property, or to unlawfully trespass upon his property, he shall
be required to give a recognizance to keep the peace for such period not to exceed one
year as the court hearing the complaint may determine.
34. See Op. Att'y Gen. 138 (1961); Op. Att'y Gen. 135 (1961).
35. Healy v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 325, 191 S.E.2d 736 (1972).
36. See Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 266
(1971); Note, Peace-Bond - A Questionable Procedure for a Legitimate State Interest, 74
W. VA. L. REV. 326 (1972); Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds - Summary Punishment for
Uncommitted Offenses, 52 VA. L. REv. 914 (1966).
37. See generally, Truninger, supra note 36, at 266-67; Bannon, supra note 27, at 5-6;
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 54, 60 (1978)
(presentation by Judge Golden Johnson).
38. See, e.g., Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 266 S.E.2d 895 (1980) (interspousal immunity
barred recovery for intentional tort); Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195
(1975) (created exception in wrongful death suits); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183
S.E.2d 200 (1971) (created exception to doctrine for automobile accidents).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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D. Recent Efforts to Respond Specifically to Domestic Violence in
Virginia
The Virginia General Assembly first turned its attention to the prob-
lem of domestic violence between spouses in 1977.40 Although Senate
Joint Resolution No. 89, which called for the study of physical abuse be-
tween spouses, failed to pass out of the House Courts of Justice Commit-
tee, the House Committee on Health, Welfare and Institutions volunta-
rily agreed to study the problem as a result of the concern that had been
generated.41 A series of public hearings was held, and a report with seven
recommendations was submitted to the full committee for the 1978 Gen-
eral Assembly.42 The recommendations are summarized as follows:
1) Establishment of shelters for battered spouses.
2) Provision for uniform statewide reporting system so that statistics on the
incidence of domestic violence could be reported to the 1979 General
Assembly.
3) Consideration of legislation for warrantless arrest where a battery has
been committed on one's spouse.
4) Empowering juvenile and domestic relations district courts to order
counseling and treatment for spouses in addition to criminal penalties for
offenses committed against spouses.
5) Promotion of public education on resources available to battered spouses.
6) Consideration of legislation to abrogate spousal tort immunity for assault
and battery.
7) Training for law enforcement officers in the management and resolution
of domestic quarrels.4 3
While the House Subcommittee was aware of the availability of civil
protection orders in other states,44 it chose not to make any recommenda-
tions to consider this type of legislation.
The 1978 General Assembly did enact three of the House Subcommit-
tee's recommendations. House Joint Resolution No. 31 recognized a con-
cern about domestic violence and encouraged localities to establish shel-
ters for battered spouses and their children through federal grants and
Title XX funding.45 House Joint Resolution No. 27 requested the Crimi-
nal Justice Services Commission to emphasize training of law enforce-
40. The 1975 Virginia General Assembly had enacted comprehensive legislation for the
protection of abused and neglected children. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.1 to -248.17
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
41. REPORT OF THE SuBcoMhrrEE TO STUDY BATTERED SPOUSES TO THE HOUSE COMMrrrEE
ON HEALTH, WELFARE AND INSTrrUTIONs 2 (December 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as SUBcoM-
MrrEE REPORT].
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11-13.
44. Id. at 7. The Subcommittee included a copy of the Pennsylvania Protection from
Abuse Act as Exhibit B in its Report.
45. 1978 Va. Acts at 1922. Title XX refers to part of the National Social Security Act. Id.
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ment officers in handling domestic violence.46 House Bill No. 1120
amended the Code to allow the juvenile and domestic relations court to
"impose conditions and limitations in an effort to effect the reconciliation
and rehabilitation of the parties, including, but not limited to, treatment
and counseling for either or both spouses and payment by the defendant
spouse for crisis shelter care for the complaining spouse" in cases involv-
ing offenses between spouses.47
House Bill No. 683, which would have provided for a two-year pilot
program of emergency shelters for battered spouses, was carried over un-
til 1979;4 8 however, it subsequently failed to pass. But in 1980, Chapter
18, Services for Abused Spouses, was added to the public welfare laws.4 9
That act provided a state policy statement to "support the efforts of pub-
lic and private community groups seeking to provide assistance to and
treatment for the victims of spouse abuse and to provide recognition to
the need to combat all phases of spouse abuse in this Commonwealth. '50
The statute designates the Department of Social Services to coordinate
state efforts to carry out this policy statement.5 ' The department's re-
sponsibilities include providing an information clearinghouse; encourag-
ing use of information and referral agencies to provide information on
spouse abuse; maintaining a list of available resources for the victims of
spouse abuse; promoting interagency cooperation for technical assistance,
data collection and services delivery; administering any state funds for
development of community programs; and providing technical assistance
for the development of resources for victims, such as shelters and self-
help groups.52
Although these provisions enabled the department to set up shelters
and other community services, the legislature did not appropriate funds
to carry out that purpose. Thus, the 1980 legislation provided nothing
concrete in the way of funds, services or legal remedies for battered
spouses.
During the 1982 General Assembly, Senate Bill No. 279 was enacted to
raise the marriage license fees from three dollars to ten dollars.8 3 The
purpose of the original bill was to set up a Family Trust Fund to be ap-
propriated to the Department of Social Services to expend for child abuse
46. 1978 Va. Acts at 1920.
47. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 756, at 1273 (as codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(L) (Repl. VoL
1982).
48. H.B. 683, 1978 Va. Gen. Assem.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-315 to -319 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 63.1-317.
52. Id. § 63.1-319.
53. Id. § 20-15 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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SPOUSE ABUSE
prevention and services for abused spouses.5" This method of raising
funds followed a trend nationwide to raise funds to deal with the
problems of domestic violence.55 However, the bill which was signed into
law only raised the marriage fee and did not specify its use.56 The 1982
Appropriations Bill 57 provided that an additional $400,000 for each year
of the biennium was appropriated for the purposes stated in sections
63.1-248.7(C) 58 and 63.1-319.59 The result of this change from the original
bill enables the General Assembly to appropriate the funds raised from
the increase in the marriage license tax for another purpose in 1984, if it
chooses to do so.
During this same period of time, a number of bills have been intro-
duced to secure more legal rights for victims of spouse abuse. In 1981,
Senate Bill No. 742 was introduced to create a new section, 16.1-253.1,
which would have enabled the juvenile and domestic relations court to
provide temporary protective orders to prevent abuse of a spouse or child
by another spouse. 0 The bill went beyond the scope of the orders already
available to protect children6" in that it proposed to allow an order to
exclude the abusing spouse from the home. As a result of the focus on the
constitutional questions related to deprivation of a property right, the bill
failed to pass. 2
In 1982, Senator Colgan, the patron of Senate Bill No. 742, attacked
54. See S.B. 279, 1982 Va. Gen. Assem.
55. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 551.332 (1982); NEv. REv. STAT. § 122.060 (1979); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 106.045, .660 (1981); W. VA. CODE 48-1-24 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-15 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
57. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 684, Item 504, at 1446.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.7(C) (Repl. Vol. 1980): "To assist in developing programs
aimed at discovering and preventing the many factors causing child abuse and neglect."
59. Id. § 63.1-319.
In dispersing funds through grants to local agencies to provide service programs for
the victims of spouse abuse, the Department of Welfare may fund both administra-
tive functions and the delivery of direct services, including a portion of: the opera-
tional costs of offices and shelters including staff, rent, utilities, travel and supplies;
twenty-four hour crisis intervention hotlines; counseling; information and referral;
self-help groups; transportation; emergency shelter; and follow-up services.
60. S.B. 742, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem.
61. Protective orders currently are available pursuant to § 16.1-253 of the Virginia Code
where necessary to protect a child's life, health or normal development pending a final adju-
dication of a petition. This statute could be used to protect a battered spouse where the
child's safety is also in issue and a petition has been filed pursuant to the present jurisdic-
tional authority found in VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Repl. Vol. 1982). This statute, however,
fails to provide assistance to the battered spouse who either has no children or where the
children have already reached majority.
This statute also does not include a provision to bar an abusing parent from the home for
a temporary period of time, as suggested by the legislative proposal in this comment. See
infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
62. Telephone conversation with Senator Charles J. Colgan, patron of S.B. 742 (Aug.,
1982).
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the problem in another way. In this session of the General Assembly, he
introduced Senate Bill No. 232 to amend section 19.2-45 and enable mag-
istrates to prohibit an abusing spouse from reentering his home until a
judge had the opportunity to act on the motion.13 This bill also failed.
However, the following April, the Attorney General released an official
opinion which states that
[a] magistrate or other judicial officer has [the] authority to forbid [a] per-
son accused of spouse abuse from returning to his/her own home as [a] con-
dition of release pursuant to § 19.2-123(a)(4) when said official believes
there is a danger that physical abuse may recur and that [the] restriction is
necessary to assure [the] accused's good behavior pending trial."
Despite this 1982 Attorney General opinion, Senator Colgan introduced
Senate Bill No. 100 at the 1983 General Assembly session. The bill would
have amended section 19.2-123 to provide expressly that where offenses
are committed by family members, "restrictions may be placed on con-
tacts with family members and visitation of the residence of any family
member" in order to assure the accused's good behavior pending trial or
hearing or to assure his appearance at trial or a hearing.6 5 This bill also
failed to pass.
Only one piece of legislation has passed the Virginia General Assembly
to broaden legal protections available to abused spouses. This protection,
however, is only made available where a suit for divorce or annulment is
pending. Under section 20-103 of the Virginia Code, the court may ex-
clude a spouse from the jointly owned or jointly rented residence upon a
showing of "reasonable apprehension of physical harm [to the other
spouse]." 66 Such relief can be obtained for up to fifteen days through an
ex parte hearing.6 7 The order may be extended "for such longer period as
the court deems appropriate" after notice and a full hearing is
conducted. 8
While this statute provides protection for abuse victims in the context
of a divorce or annulment proceeding, it clearly overlooks the plight of an
abused spouse who needs protection from a violent partner, but is unwill-
ing or unable to file a bill of complaint for a divorce. Depending on the
history of abuse in the family, an abuse victim may very likely wish to
continue the marriage if somehow the abuse could be stopped. Civil pro-
tective orders, such as those available in most states,6 9 would enable
abuse victims to obtain immediate relief by separating the parties, pro-
63. S.B. 232, 1982 Va. Gen. Assem.
64. Op. Att'y Gen. 238 (1982).
65. S.B. 100, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Appendix, §§ E, F.
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viding a "cooling off" period, preventing serious injury during the interim
and giving the couple time to determine whether the marriage can be
salvaged.
IV. PROTECTIVE ORDER LEGISLATION
A. How Can Such Legislation be Justified?
Although abused spouses in Virginia generally have a remedy available
to them through the criminal justice system, 0 these victims of spouse
abuse do not have any realistic civil remedy to protect them against fu-
ture attacks and to facilitate resolution of domestic disputes without end-
ing the marriage. Neither divorce 1 nor the imposition of criminal punish-
ment or tort liability for past injuries received 2 serve to promote the
welfare of the family s by preventing future attacks or to foster resolution
of the problems between the parties themselves.
Much of the prior legislation has been concerned with the community's
role in protecting abused spouses through the funding of shelters and
other support services. 1 ' The growth of shelters is in response to the need
for a safe place where the victim and children can go, while the abusing
spouse retains full use of the family residence and personal property. A
civil protective order would enable the victim(s) to remain in the resi-
dence and force the abusing party to seek other accommodations until a
court is convinced that the threat of injury in the home is removed. As a
result of this purely private remedy, less demand would be placed on
public funds to shelter abuse victims.
The traditional remedy of criminal prosecution places the responsibil-
ity of securing a remedy for an abuse victim on the prosecutor.
Prosecutorial reluctance in such cases has been well documented.7 5 The
primary responsibility for obtaining a civil protective order, however, is
on the party who has the greatest interest in the result-the victim. Al-
though the abuse victim is often described as having feelings of depen-
dency, powerlessness and low self-esteem,7 it is possible that the ability
to use self-help and to have the opportunity to take control of the situa-
tion with the help of the legal system would serve to facilitate resolution
70. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(6), (9) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Under both these grounds the
parties must be separated for one year before a divorce can be obtained.
72. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (Repl. Vol. 1982): "It is the intention of this law that in
all proceedings the welfare of the child and the family is the paramount concern of the
State...."
74. See supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
76. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FAmLY VIOLENCE: INTERVENTION STRATE-
GIES 12-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTEVTrr ION STRATEGIES].
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of the violent patterns within the family by altering the balance of power.
An analogy for the success of civil remedies over criminal remedies can
be found in the implementation of the Child Abuse and Neglect Act. 7 In
1975, identification of child abuse and neglect situations was transferred
out of the criminal justice system and into the human resources area." As
a direct result of this change from a punitive to a rehabilitative approach
to a family problem, over 20,000 children each year since 1975 have been
identified as suspected cases. 79 The General Assembly recognized, how-
ever, that the criminal justice system should step in where a serious in-
jury or offense is involved. As a result, an overlap with the criminal jus-
tice system has been expressly provided for in certain cases.8 0
Similarly, in spousal abuse situations, the pattern of abuse is one that
affects all members of the family.8 1 Where rehabilitation and voluntary
resolution of the problem can be achieved, the civil, rather than the crim-
inal, alternatives are less disruptive to the family. 2 However, there may
be situations where protection can realistically be obtained only through
the criminal side of the court. Still, a civil protective order is an alterna-
tive that could be made available in both situations since its purpose is to
prohibit certain behavior and prescribe certain conditions to be followed
to provide protection to an abuse victim.83
77. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.1 to -248.17 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
78. Compare Id. § 63.1-248.1 with former VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-217.1 to -217.4 (Cum.
Supp. 1968).
79. Conversation with staff, Bureau of Child Protective Services, Va. Dept. of Social Ser-
vices (Mar., 1983). Prior to the 1975 legislation, only 426 children had been identified as
possibly abused or neglected. Id.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(D)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
When abuse or neglect is suspected in any cases involving death of a child or
injury to the child in which a felony is also suspected for which the penalty pre-
scribed by law is not less than five years imprisonment or where there is sexual abuse
or suspected sexual abuse of a child involving the use of display of the child in sexu-
ally explicit visual material, as defined in § 18.2-374.1, report immediately to the
Commonwealth's attorney and make available to the Commonwealth's attorney the
records of the local department upon which such report is founded....
81. See INTERVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 76, at 29-31; Rosenbaum & O'Leary, Chil-
dren: The Unintended Victims of Marital Violence, 51(4) AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 692
(1981).
82. Temporary eviction from the home of the abusing partner still enables the parties to
participate in treatment toward resolution of the problems; incarceration would not.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-316 (Repl. Vol. 1982). Many states provide that protection or-
ders are also available to any household or family member and/or unmarrieds who are living
together as man and wife. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT., §
09.55.640 (Cum. Supp. 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(c) (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 14-4-101(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38(2)(a) (West Supp.
1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(1) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-701 (1982); HAwAII REv.
STAT. § 585-1 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-3, § 103(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(2) (Supp. 1982); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3102(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762(4) (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
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B. Components of a Protective Order Statute
To date, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted
special statutory provisions to enable victims of domestic violence to ob-
tain a civil protective order without the necessity of filing criminal
charges or a suit for divorce.84 The purpose of this section is to outline
the amendments to Virginia's Juvenile and Domestic Relations District
Court Law86 which would be necessary to create such a remedy for vic-
tims in Virginia. The proposed amendments are compiled in the Appen-
dix and reference is made to each provision in the following text.
1. Definitions
The Virginia General Assembly has previously defined "spouse abuse"
CODE ANN. § 4-501(e) (Cu . Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (Michie Cum.
Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 § 2(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-3(d) (Cur. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(6) (Vernon Supp. 1983); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-903(1) (1978); NEv. REV. STAT. § 33.020(1) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
173-B:1(II) (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-3(a) (1981); N.Y. Fim. CT. ACT § 812(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (Cu. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07.1-02(1) (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(3) -(4) (Cu. Supp. 1982); OR. Rav.
STAT. § 107.705(2) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182 (Purdon 1977); S.D. CODUFiED LAWS
ANN. § 25-10-1(2) (Supp. 1981); TEx. Fim. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 71.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982);
UTA I CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(3) (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(b) (Cur. Supp. 1982);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.025(2)(a) (West Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-102(a)(iv) (Cu.
Supp. 1982).
84. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.600 to .640
(Cu. Supp. 1980); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (West Supp. 1982); CAL. CIv. Ploc.
CODE §§ 540-553 and CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 14-4-
101 to -105 (Cu. Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38 (West Cum. Supp. 1982);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-701 to -705 (Cum. Supp.
1982); HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 586-1 to -11 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-1 to -3,
1 2302-1 to -13 (West Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.1 to .11 (Supp. 1982); KA. Civ.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 60-3101 to -3111 (Vernon Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.010
(1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 761-771 (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
4-501 to -506 (Cum. Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 1-6 (Michie Cur. Supp.
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Cur. Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to
-29 (Cu. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 455.010 to .085 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-19-201 to -204, -301 to -307, -401 to -406, 40-4-106 (1982); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 42-924 to -927 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.020 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:1 to -B:lla (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-1 to -16 (West 1982); N.Y. FAm.
CT. ACT §§ 812-847 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1 to -8 (Cu. Supp.
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07.1-01 to -08 (Repl. Vol. 1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§
3113.31 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700 to .720 (1981); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977); R.L GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Cu. Supp. 1982);
S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-10-1 to -14 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1201 to -
1215 (Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 71.01 to .19 (West Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-1 to -9 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-1108 (Cur.
Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-1 to -10 (Cu. Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.025
(West Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-21-101 to -107 (Cu. Supp. 1982).
85. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-226 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
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as "any act of violence, including any forceful detention, which results in
physical injury and which is committed by a person against another per-
son to whom such person is married or has been married.""6 This defini-
tion covers only those acts which result in physical injury. 7 A protective
order, however, should also be available in situations where the abusing
partner's threats of physical abuse place the victim in fear of bodily in-
jury.88 In this way the protective order can more successfully accomplish
its goal of preventing abuse by eliminating the necessity of a prior serious
injury. In fact the Virginia General Assembly already has recognized the
need for a remedy where the victim may have a "reasonable apprehension
of physical harm" where a suit for divorce or annulment is pending.8 9
2. Jurisdiction
The juvenile and domestic relations court currently has jurisdiction
over spouse abuse cases only where a criminal charge has been filed. The
court hears all cases where an offense has been committed by one family
member against another or where a criminal warrant has been taken out
by one family member against another.9 0 A new section 16.1-241(M)
should be created in order to authorize the court to hear civil cases in
which an abused spouse seeks a protective order against an abusing
spouse.9 1
86. Id. § 63.1-316 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
87. All statutes cited supra note 84 cover situations of actual physical contact with the
other spouse.
88. See Appendix, § A. Twenty-nine states currently provide a remedy where threats of
injury constitute the abuse: ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 542(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-101(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 586-1(1)
(Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 2301-3, § 103(1) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1983);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.710(1)
(Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762(1)(B) (1981); MD. CTS. &
Juv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-501(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1(b)
(Michie Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(a)(i) (West Cum.
Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
455.010(1) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201(5) (1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-903(1)(b) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.020(1)(b) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
173-B:1(I)(b) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1)(b) (Baldwin
Cum. Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(1)(b) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182(ii)
(Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Cum. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-
10-1(1) (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(1)(b) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1101(1)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980); Wyo. STAT. §
35-21-102(a)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
90. Id. § 16.1-241(J) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
91. See Appendix, § B.
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3. Procedures
Most civil actions in juvenile and domestic relations court are initiated
by petitions filed with intake officers of the court services unit.9 2 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court is authorized by section 16.1-262 of the Virginia
Code to prescribe the form of these petitions."3 Therefore, section 16.1-
262 of the Virginia Code should be amended so as to authorize the su-
preme court to prescribe the form and contents of the petition to be used
by abused spouses who are seeking a protective order.9 Sixteen states
and the District of Columbia expressly require the court to provide the
forms necessary to initiate proceedings concerning protective orders to fa-
cilitate the abuse victim's access to court. 5 Many states also expressly
waive the filing fee together with any bonds that may be required for
abuse victims who initiate such actions.96 In Virginia, however, the peti-
tioner can avoid such expenses only if he or she is indigent and allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis.7
4. Ex Parte Orders of Protection
All states providing for protective orders except Rhode Island authorize
the issuance of such order ex parte, the rationale being the necessity of
providing prompt relief to those spouses in imminent danger of harm.98
Most states require a showing of an immediate and present danger of
abuse prior to the granting of an ex parte order.9
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
93. Id. § 16.1-262.
94. See Appendix, § C. Such petition may require only amending the form in current use,
Form DC-511 3/82.
95. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.620 (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(B)
(Cum. Supp. 1983); CAL. CIv. PRoC. CODE § 543 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-1003 (1981); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 586-3(c) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
764(2) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(4)(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
455.025 (Vernon Cum Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II) (Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-12(d) (West 1982); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(4) (McKinney Cure. Supp.
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(3) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1204 (Cum. Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(C) (Cum. Supp. 1982);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-4(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-103(e) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
96. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104 (Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
764(3) (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-502(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01(10)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-3(4)
(Supp. 1982).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
98. See infra note 99.
99. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(b) (Cu. Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-103(2) (Cu.
Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38(1)(b) & (2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.4(2) (West Supp. 1982); KAN. CIV. PROc. CODE ANN. § 60-3106(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.710(3)(a) (Baldwin Cur. Supp. 1982); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(2) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(7) (West Cu. Supp. 1983);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11(2) (Cu . Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (Vernon Cu.
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While most of the states have statutory provisions applicable to both ex
parte orders and orders issued after a full hearing, some states have re-
stricted the use of ex parte orders to forcing the respondent to refrain
from any acts of abuse, 100 granting exclusive possession and use of a resi-
dence to the petitioner 01 or ordering temporary custody of the
children.'0 2
Some statutes limit the duration of ex parte orders to a specific number
of days. 03 Others allow such order to continue in effect until a full hear-
Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03(1) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3113.31(D) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(e)(2) (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1018(b) (Purdon 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1205 (Cum. Supp. 1982);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(1) (Supp. 1982).
Other states require different standards before an ex parte order will be issued: ALASKA
STAT. § 09.55.610(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (substantial likelihood of immediate danger);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(C) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (reasonable cause to believe an act of
violence has been or may be committed); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 545 (West Supp. 1982)
(reasonable proof of past act of abuse); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(c) (1981) (welfare or
safety is immediately endangered); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-703(b) (1982) (substantial likelihood
of immediate danger); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-4, § 204(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1982) (irreparable injury likely to occur); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 4 (Michie Cum.
Supp. 1981) (substantial likelihood of immediate danger); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(4)
(1981) (irreparable injury will occur); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-925 (1978) (irreparable harm,
loss or damage); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(c) (West 1981) (necessary to protect life, health
and well-being); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-6 (Supp. 1982) (immediate and irrepara-
ble injury, loss or damage); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (clear and
present danger of violence); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(2) (Supp. 1981) (occurrence of abuse
or substantial likelihood of immediate danger); Wvo. STAT. § 35-21-104(a)(i) (Cum. Supp.
1982) (real danger of further abuse).
100. COLO. REV. STAT. 14-4-103(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. §
60-3106(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(4)(B) (1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(7)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6(I) (Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
03(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(a) (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(1)(c) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-6(1) (Supp.
1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1206(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1104(a)(1)(A) & (B) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-103(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107
(Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(4)(C) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01(7)(b) (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(2) (Vernon Supp. 1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6(II) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03(2)(b) (Repl. Vol.
1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D), (E)(1)(b) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.718(1)(b) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-6(2) (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
102. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-103(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.045(3)
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03(2)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.718(1)(a) (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
103. Statutes which specify a specific number of days often allow extensions where the
scheduled full hearing is continued or where the court deems necessary: ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.610(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (10 days); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(c) (1981) (10 days);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, T 2302-11, § 211(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (10 days); MINN. STAT.
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ing before the court.'" Many states also provide that the full hearing
must take place within a prescribed period following the date of the ex
parte order.105
Because important rights are adjudicated at an ex parte hearing, Vir-
ginia should limit the purposes for granting an ex parte order to the
following:
1) prohibiting further acts of abuse;
2) prohibiting such other contacts as the court deems necessary;
3) granting possession of a jointly owned or jointly rented residence to the
petitioner to the exclusion of the abusing spouse; or
4) requiring the abusing spouse to provide suitable alternative housing for
the petitioner and children.""
These provisions would provide protection to the abuse victim pending a
full hearing without requiring the court to adjudicate other rights, such as
support and child custody.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of these provisions is the tempo-
rary deprivation of the use and possession of a shared residence from the
respondent before having an opportunity to participate in a hearing. Al-
though some judges have testified outside the courtroom that such a pro-
vision is constitutionally suspect,107 a number of courts that have ad-
ANN. § 518B.01(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (14 days); Mss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1982) (10 days); Nay. Rav. STAT. § 33.020(5) (1979) (15 days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
07.1-03(3) (Repl. Vol. 1981) (30 days); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718 (1981) (one year); S.D. CODI-
FED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-7 (Supp. 1981) (14 days); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.15(b)-(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1982) (20 days); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.025(2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1982) (5
days).
104. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(b), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4(2)-(3) (West
Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3106(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 403.710(3)-(4) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(2), (4),
(6) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
13(c), (e) (West 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10185(b)-(c) (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-5(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(1), (3) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
105. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.610(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (earliest possible time after 10 days
notice to respondent); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (10 days from
written request by respondent); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 546 (West Cum. Supp. 1982) (20 to
25 days); HAwI REv. STAT. § 585-5 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (15 days); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 4-503(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (5 days from service of order on respondent);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 4 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1981) (5 days); INN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (7 days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6 (Supp. 1981)
(5 days from request by respondent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(c) (1982) (10 days); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50B-2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (10 days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03(4) (RepL
Vol. 1981) (14 days); OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982) (7
court days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-1205 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (10 days from service on respon-
dent); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (10 days); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5
(Repl. Vol. 1980) (5 days); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-104(a)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (72 hours).
106. See Appendix, § D.
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dressed this issue have found that ex parte orders under certain
conditions do not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.0 s A Pennsylvania court has noted that a notice requirement would
defeat the purpose of a protective order by increasing the risk of domestic
violence. 09 What is needed is "immediate temporary relief in a volatile
situation where there is imminent danger of recurring or further abuse to
the plaintiff or children. 10
In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel.
Williams v. Marsh,"' the court applied the balancing test of Matthews v.
Eldridge' and found that the ex parte order provisions of the Missouri
Adult Abuse Act "comply with due process requirements because they are
a reasonable means to achieve the state's legitimate goal of preventing
domestic violence, and afford adequate procedural safeguards, prior to
and after any deprivation occurs." ' s
Applying the Matthews v. Eldridge test, the court in Marsh balanced
the respondent's property interest in his home and his liberty interest in
the custody of his children. Balanced against these interests was the gov-
ernment's interest in promoting the health, welfare and safety of its citi-
zens. 14 To serve this state interest, states may use their police powers to
adopt reasonable summary procedures."15 The third part of the test is the
"'fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and
the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.' """1 In
Marsh, the court was satisfied that the statute as written was narrowly
drawn and thus constitutionally sound. In upholding the Missouri Adult
Abuse Act, the court emphasized that only a court could issue an ex parte
order upon a showing of "'immediate and present danger of abuse.' ""f2
The court noted that under the Missouri Act, a judge could issue such an
order only after the petitioner had filed a verified petition satisfying this
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE 50-52 (1982).
108. See Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972); State ex rel. Williams v.
Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 228-32 (Mo. 1982); People v. Derisi, 110 Misc. 2d 718, 442 N.Y.S. 2d
908, 908-09 (1981); People v. Faieta, 109 Misc. 2d 841, 440 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1981);
Boyle v. Boyle, 5 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2916 (Pa. C.P., Allegheny Co. 1979); Ohio v. Heyl,
No. C 79 BR 120 (Hamilton Co., Ohio, Municipal Ct. 1979), summarized in Woods, Chal-
lenges to Legislation Enacted on Behalf of Battered Women, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 426,
427 (1980). See also Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 286 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052, appeal dis-
missed, 449 U.S. 807, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980) (divorce action).
109. Boyle v. Boyle, 5 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2916, 2917 (Pa. C.P., Allegheny Co., 1979).
110. Id. at 2916.
111. 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
112. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
113. 626 S.W.2d at 232.
114. Id. at 230.
115. Id. at 231 (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
116. 626 S.W.2d at 231 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343).
117. 626 S.W.2d at 232.
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statutory standard,118 that ex parte orders were effective only up to
fifteen days, after which time a hearing was to be conducted and that
nothing in the Act prohibited the respondent from obtaining an earlier
hearing.1 9 Following other states, the court noted that the "[e]xisting
remedies such as peace bonds, regular criminal process and tort law have
proved to be less than adequate in aiding the victims of abuse and in
preventing further abuse."' 20
Commentators on the constitutionality of an ex parte order to tempora-
rily deprive an abusing party of the use or possession of his residence
generally approve of such orders based on (1) the Supreme Court's sanc-
tioning of summary procedures for deprivation of property in other con-
texts,' 2 and (2) the flexible nature of due process as set forth in Mat-
thews v. Eldridge.2 2
5. Dispositional Alternatives
a. Order of Protection as Disposition in a Criminal Proceeding
Currently
Where one spouse has committed a criminal offense against the other,
Virginia authorizes a court to order treatment, counseling, payment of
crisis shelter care and to make other provisions necessary to bring about
the reconciliation and rehabilitation of the parties."2 A civil protective
order can be designed to effect the same result." 4 The same components
available in a criminal proceeding against a spouse should also be availa-
ble in a civil action against the spouse. 12 5 An amendment to section 16.1-
279(L) of the Virginia Code would achieve this result."16
b. Order of Protection as Disposition in a Civil Proceeding
Upon a showing of spouse abuse, the court should have a variety of
alternatives available to prevent further abuse and to provide continued
protection for a period of time. During this specified period, the parties
can attempt to resolve the problems which gave rise to the violence and
118. Id.
119. Id. at 231.
120. Id. at 226.
121. See The Constitutionality of Ex Parte Proceedings, in BOYLAN & TAUB, ADULT Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES, Part II, 96 (Legal
Services Corp. 1981); Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alter-
native Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95 (1980); Note, Domes-
tic Relations - The Protection From Abuse Act, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 116, 121-24 (1978).
122. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(L) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
124. See Appendix, § F.
125. See id.
126. See Appendix, § E.
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can determine whether reconciliation, permanent separation, or divorce is
the answer. The availability of a civil protective order would not preclude
the involvement of the criminal justice system should the civil order
prove to be ineffective in a particular case.1 2 7
A civil protective order does not currently exist in Virginia, making the
enactment of a new subsection necessary to authorize courts to grant such
an order as the final disposition of a civil action. 128 Such authorization
should enable a judge to fashion adequate protection in a particular case
by granting him the authority to issue such orders as those:
1) prohibiting acts of abuse; 29
2) prohibiting other contacts between the parties as deemed
necessary;'30
3) excluding the abusing spouse from the jointly owned or rented
residence;
3
1
127. Only in New York may an abuse victim elect between proceeding either in family
court or in criminal court. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 847 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
128. See Appendix, § F.
129. All state provisions cited supra note 84 include a requirement that the abusing
spouse refrain from further abusive acts.
130. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3602(D)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359(a)(2) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1005(c)(3) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-704(a)(9) (1982); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 586-5
(Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
106(2)(b) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. JUD. LAW §
842(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Baldwin Cum.
Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Cum. Supp. 1982); Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
71.11(a)(1)(B), (C) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.025(2)(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
131. Some states vary this provision depending on the ownership interest in the home.
Other states allow the eviction of the respondent without regard to title ownership. See ALA.
CODE § 30-5-7(a)(2), (a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(2) (Cum. Supp.
1980); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(D)(2) (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4359(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38(b)(3) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-704(a)(2), (a)(5) (1982); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 586-5 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, T 2302-8, § 208(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(2) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
766(1)(B), (1)(C) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-
503(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3(b) (Michie Law. Co-op. Cum.
Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-
050(1)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(2)(c) (1981); NEB. REv. STAT. §
42-924(3) (1978), § 33.020(4)(b) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(a)(2) (Supp.
1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(2)-(4) (West 1982); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 842(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(2), (a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07.1-02(4)(b)-02(6) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(b), (c) (Bald-
win Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.716(2)(b) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
10186(a)(2), (a)(3) (Purdon 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(2) (Supp. 1982);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1206(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(2)
(Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(1) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1103(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(1)(b), (1)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1980); Wis.
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4) requiring the abusing spouse to provide alternative housing for
petitioner;"3 2
5) awarding temporary custody, support, and/or visitation of minor
children; 3 3
6) awarding temporary support and maintenance to petitioner; 34
7) requiring any of the parties to participate in counseling or treat-
ment; 35 and
STAT. ANN. § 813.025(2)(a) (West Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(i) (Cum. Supp.
1982).
132. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(3) (Cur. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-704(a)(3)
(1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 2302-8, § 208(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.5(2)(b) (West Supp. 1982); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3107(a)(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1)(C)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(C) (Cur. Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(3) (West 1982);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(a)(3) (Pur-
don 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1206(3) (Cur. Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(1)(c)
(1980); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
133. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(4), (5) (Cum. Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(4),
(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 547(a), (b) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-704(a)(4), (6) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 2302-8, § 208c(3)(4), (7) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(d), (e) (West Supp. 1982); KAN. Civ. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 60-3107(a)(4), (6) (Vernon Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.710(3)(b),
(c) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(1)(E), (G) (Cum. Supp.
1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-503(b)(3) (Cur. Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 209A, § 3(c), (d) (Michie Law. Co-op. Cure. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01
(6)(c), (d) (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 455.050(2)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:4(I)(b)(2) to (4) (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(5) (West 1981); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(4), (6) (Cur. Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14 -07.1-02(4)(C), (e) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3113.31(E)(1)(d) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.716(2)(a) (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(a)(4) (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Supp. 1982); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(3), (4) (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1206(4) (Cum.
Supp. 1982); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(3), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1103(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(1)(d) (Cune. Supp. 1982);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
134. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(4)
(Cure. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-704(a)(7) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-8, §
208(c)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(e) (West Supp. 1982); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.710(3)(b) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
766(1)(G) (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3(d) (Michie Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1981);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(d) (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(2),(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(b)(4) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(e) (1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (Bald-
win Cum. Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
25-10-5(4) (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1206(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 71.11(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-l(e) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Wvo.
STAT. § 35-21-105(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
135. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(J) (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 547(d)
(West Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(2) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-8,
§ 208(c)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(1) (West Supp. 1982); KAN.
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8) any other relief deemed appropriate.
A realistic period for the parties to attempt to resolve the situation
while continuing under the court's supervision would be three months.
However, if, at the end of the three months, there is a showing of contin-
uing abuse or likelihood of abuse, the court should have the ability to
continue the order for another three-month period. The court should
have the ability to renew the order for successive three-month periods up
to a total period of one year.28 After a year, the parties should have been
able to reach decisions about their long-term plans for the family so that
court intervention would no longer be necessary. Each component of the
protective order should be a separate provision, and the court should
CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3107(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
766(1)(F) (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-503(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(e), (f) (West Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(f) (Cum.
Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I)(b)(5) (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
13(b)(7) (West 1982); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 842(g) (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07.1-02(4)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(f) (Baldwin Cum.
Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-19 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5(5)
(Supp. 1982); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-
105(a)(vii) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
For a discussion on treatment programs for battering spouses, see A. GANLEY, COURT-
MANDATED COUNSELING FOR MEN WHO BATTER: A THREE-DAY WORKSHOP FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (Center for Women's Policy Studies 1981) and M. Roy, THE ABUsIVE
PARTNER (1982).
136. The states differ in the maximum duration for protective orders: ALA. CODE § 30-5-
7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (one year); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (45 days
plus 45-day extension); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(6) (Supp. 1982) (six months); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 548 (West Supp. 1983) (one year plus extensions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466-38(c), (d) (West Supp. 1982) (90 days plus extension); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(d)
(1981) (one year plus extension); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-704(c) (Cum. Supp 1982) (six months);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 586-5 (Supp. 1982) (30 days plus 30-day extensions); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, 2302-11, § 211(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (one year); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)
(West Supp. 1982) (one year); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(c) (Supp. 1982) (one year); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.710(4) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982) (effective until further order by
the court); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(2) (1981) (one year plus extension); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (Michie Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1981) (one year plus extension);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6) (West Supp. 1983) (one year); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-
17(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (one year); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455,040(1) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (180
days plus 180-day extension); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(3) (1981) (one year); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 33.020(5) (1979) (30 days); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(III) (Supp. 1981) (one
year plus extension); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1982) (one year); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50B-3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (one year plus extension); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3113.31(E)(3) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982) (one year); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.716(3) (RepL
Vol. 1981) (one year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(b) (Purdon 1977) (one year); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (Supp. 1982) (generally one year, except 30-day limit on ex-
clusion from residence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1210 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (one year); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (one year); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-5(4)
(Supp. 1981) (60 days); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (one year plus
extension); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980) (30 days); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
813.025(2)(b) (West Supp. 1982) (2 years); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-106(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (3
months plus 3-month extension).
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have discretion to include all or one of the above provisions in its order.
Thus, a provision barring the respondent from the residence could be de-
leted from the order upon motion to the court, with continuing court su-
pervision of the family's situation so as to monitor compliance with other
provisions of the order such as the prohibition of abusive acts and court-
ordered treatment.
The states vary in their treatment of a violation of the protective order.
Some states make such a violation a criminal misdemeanor offense,' 37
while others make it a contempt of court. 131 Still others treat it as being
both a misdemeanor offense and a contempt of court."19 In Virginia,
courts may impose fines as well as a jail sentence in civil contempt pro-
ceedings."10 However, due to the seriousness of the acts being proscribed
under a protective order, the court should have the flexibility to treat any
violation as a Class 1 misdemeanor.
C. Use and Effect of Protective Orders Where Available
Protective orders have been viewed favorably by battered women and
prosecutors."' Statistics indicate that protective orders are used regularly
where they are available."42 In 1982, San Francisco county and city aided
137. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 551 (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 586-11 (Supp.
1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.020(9)
(1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-13 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(3)
(Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(d) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.33
(West 1982).
138. ALA. CODE § 30-5-10(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(F)
(Cum. Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1981); IowA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (Supp. 1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Cum.
Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:8 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-15(b)
(West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3113.31(H) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.720(3) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 10190 (Purdon Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1212; W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-7
(Repl. Vol. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-106(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
139. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-12, § 212 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 769(1) (1981), tit. 17-A, § 4-A (2-A) (1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 4-503(c), -505 (Cum. Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14) (West Supp. 1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Repl. Vol. 1981); TEX. FAhi. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (Vernon
Supp. 1982).
140. See United Steelworkers v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 220 Va.
547, 260 S.E.2d 222 (1979) (contempt for violation of injunction imposed during labor
dispute).
141. Note, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16
U.S.F.L. REv. 703, 733 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Restraining Order Legislation]. This ar-
ticle cites a study conducted by the United States Department of Justice surveying 270
former clients of a family violence prevention program. Sixty-nine percent of the victims
believed that restraining orders were "somewhat" to "very" effective in preventing abuse.
Id. at 732-33 & in. 160-63.
142. Pirro, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Court Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 352, 357
(1982).
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365 women in filing petitions. 143 In the same year, 1169 petitions were
filed in the City of Baltimore with 796 ex parte orders being granted and
283 orders being continued into an indefinite protective order after a full
hearing. 44 In Philadelphia, 1470 petitions were filed during this same
period.14
5
One research study has suggested that protective orders have limita-
tions in preventing the recurrence of domestic violence. However, the
study also indicates that the effectiveness of the orders can be increased
if victims are aware of the availability of protective orders and if proce-
dures are streamlined to facilitate the filing of petitions.146 Effectiveness
is also increased where the statutory provisions and the actual enforce-
ment procedures make it clear that sanctions will be provided for all vio-
lations and where a civil protective order is available in conjunction with
other criminal and civil remedies. 147
V. CONCLUSION
The Virginia legislature should enact additional options to secure pro-
tection for victims of intrafamily violence. 148 The documentation of the
scope of the problem of spouse abuse around the country warrants a
closer examination of the problem in this state.
In particular, civil protective orders which have been used most effec-
tively in other states, should be available to aid abuse victims. This civil
remedy can supplement and enhance the civil and criminal remedies al-
ready available. Such an approach constitutes
[a] constructive middle way short of either criminal[ly] prosecuting or ig-
noring the violation of law .... [which may] . . . be helpful to the family
in the sense that the [abuser's] presence in the community under an order
of protection and his continuance in his employment without a criminal re-
143. Telephone interview with Administrative Coordinator, W.O.M.A.N. Inc., San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (March, 1983) (counselling and support services program for battered women).
144. Telephone interview with Clerk's Office, District Court - Civil Division, City of Balti-
more (March, 1983).
The Maryland Commission for Women has also compiled statistics for a two-year period
which indicate that 2843 petitions were filed statewide. Almost half of these resulted in the
issuance of protective orders. Maryland Commission for Women, Information Regarding Pe-
titions Filed in Maryland District Courts Under the Protection From Domestic Violence
Act, July 1, 1980-June 30, 1982 (July, 1982) (unpublished report).
145. Telephone interview with Appointment's Clerk, Family Division, Court of Common
Pleas, City of Philadelphia (March, 1983).
146. J. Graw, J. Fagan and H. Wexler, Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of
Access and Efficacy 16-18 (January 31, 1983) (unpublished article available from the URSA
Institute, Pier 11/2 San Francisco, Cal.) [hereinafter cited as Graw]; see also Note, Re-
straining Order Legislation, supra note 141, at 132-33.
147. Graw, supra note 146.
148. See Wadlington, Virginia Domestic Relations Law: Recent Developments, 67 VA. L.
REv. 351, 353 (1980).
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cord might be important to his children." 9
The Virginia General Assembly should seriously consider enacting this
type of legislation to strengthen court intervention as a realistic alterna-
tive in responding to the growing problem of domestic violence.
Cheryl A. Wilkerson
149. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 1657, 1684 (1981) (quoting Montalvo v. Montalvo, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 702-03, 286
N.Y.S.2d 605, 610 (Faro. Ct. 1968).
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APPENDIX
A. Add New Section:
§ 16.1-228(T) "Spouse abuse" means any act of violence, including any
forceful detention, which results in physical injury or places one in
reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury and which is com-
mitted by a person against a spouse, notwithstanding that such per-
sons may be separated and living apart.
B. Add New Section:
§ 16.1-241(M) Petitions may be filed by a spouse for the purpose of
obtaining an order of protection pursuant to § 16.1-253.1 or § 16.1-
279(N) as a result of spouse abuse.
C. Amend § 16.1-262 (last paragraph) (amendment is underlined):
In accordance with § 16.1-69.32 of the Code, the Supreme Court may
formulate rules for the form and content of petitions in the juvenile
court concerning matters related to the custody, visitation or support
of a child and the protection, support or maintenance of an adult
where the provisions of this section are not appropriate.
D. Add New Section:
§ 16.1-253.1 Preliminary protective orders in cases of spouse abuse.
A. Upon the filing of a petition alleging that the petitioner is or
has been subjected to spouse abuse, the court may issue a
preliminary order of protection against an abusing spouse in
order to protect the health and safety of the petitioner. Such
order may be issued in an ex parte proceeding upon good
cause shown where the petition is supported by an affidavit
or sworn testimony before the judge or intake officer. Imme-
diate and present danger of spouse abuse shall constitute
good cause under this section. A preliminary order of protec-
tion may include, but is not limited to the following provi-
sions to be imposed on the abusing spouse:
1. Prohibition of further acts of spouse abuse.
2. Prohibition of such other contacts between the parties as
the court deems appropriate.
3. Granting possession of the jointly owned or the jointly
leased residence to the petitioner to the exclusion of the
abusing spouse; provided however, that no such grant of
possession shall affect title to any real or personal
property.
4. Requiring that the abusing spouse provide suitable alter-
native housing for the petitioner and any children, where
appropriate.
Such preliminary order of protection shall remain in ef-
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fect until a full adversary hearing can be held by the
court.
B. A copy of an ex parte preliminary order of protection shall be
served as soon as possible on the abusing spouse. Within ten
days of the issuing of an ex parte preliminary order of protec-
tion, the court shall provide an adversary hearing on the peti-
tion. Notice of such hearing shall be served on the abusing
spouse with the copy of the ex parte preliminary order of
protection. When feasible, the abusing spouse may request a
hearing in less than ten days.
C. The preliminary order is effective upon service on the abus-
ing spouse. Any violation of the order shall constitute con-
tempt of court. Such violation may also be punishable as a
Class 1 misdemeanor.
D. At a full hearing on the petition, the petitioner must prove
the allegation of spouse abuse by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Upon proof of such spouse abuse, the court may issue
an order of protection pursuant to § 16.1-279(N).
E. Amend § 16.1-279(L) (amendment is underlined):
In cases involving the violation of any law, regulation or ordinance for
the education, protection or care of children or involving offenses com-
mitted by one spouse against another, the juvenile court or the circuit
court may impose a penalty prescribed by applicable sections of the
Code; provided, however, in cases involving offenses committed by one
spouse against another, the court may impose conditions and limita-
tions in any effort to effect the reconciliation and rehabilitation of the
parties, including, but not limited to, an order of protection as pro-
vided in § 16.1-279(N), treatment and counseling for either or both
spouses and payment by the defendant spouse for crisis shelter care for
the complaining spouse.
F. Add New Section:
§ 16.1-279(N)
A. In cases of spouse abuse, the court may issue an order of pro-
tection to protect the health and safety of the petitioner, and
to effect the rehabilitation and reconciliation by the parties
where the court deems it appropriate. An order of protection
issued under this section may include, but is not limited to,
the following provisions:
1. Prohibition of further acts of spouse abuse.
2. Prohibition of such contacts between the parties as the
court deems appropriate.
3. Granting possession of the jointly owned or jointly rented
residence to the petitioner to the exclusion of the abusing
spouse; provided however, no such grant of possession
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shall affect title to any real or personal property.
4. Requiring that the abusing spouse provide suitable alter-
native housing for the petitioner, and, if appropriate, any
children.
5. Awarding temporary custody and support as well as visi-
tation rights concerning the minor children, if appro-
priate.
6. Ordering the abusing spouse to pay temporary support
and maintenance to the petitioner.
7. Ordering one or both parties to participate in treatment,
counseling or other programs designed for the rehabilita-
tion of the parties.
8. Any other relief necessary for the protection of the peti-
tioner and minor children.
B. Such order of protection shall be issued for a specified period
not to exceed three months. However, such order may be ex-
tended for other three month periods by the court upon mo-
tion of the petitioner and upon a showing that such contin-
ued protection is necessary, up to a total period of one year.
C. Any violation of an order of protection issued under this sec-
tion shall constitute contempt of court. Such violation may
also be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.
D. The court may assess costs and/or attorneys fees against ei-
ther party regardless of whether an order of protection has
been issued as a result of a full hearing.
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